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Abstract
We develop a frictionless matching model under transferable utility where individuals are
characterized by a continuous trait and a binary attribute. The model incorporates attributes
for which there are heterogeneous preferences in the population regarding their desirability, that
is, the impact of the traits cannot be summarized by a one-dimensional attractiveness index.
We present a general resolution strategy based on optimal control theory, and characterize the
stable matching. We then consider education and smoking status, further specify the model by
observing that there are more male than female smokers above each education level, and derive
additional predictions about equilibrium matching patterns and how individuals with different
smoking habits “marry down” or “marry up” by education. Using the CPS March and Tobacco
Use Supplements for the period 1996 to 2003, we find that the hypotheses based on our model
predictions are borne out in the data. (JEL: D1, J1.)
Keywords: multidimensional matching, marital surplus, smokers, socioeconomic status,
transferable utility.
1. Introduction
Empirical evidence strongly suggests that matching processes in the marriage market
are multidimensional. Spouses tend to be similar in a variety of characteristics,
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including age, body mass index, education, race, religion, and smoking status (Becker,
1991; Oreffice and Quintana-Domeque, 2010; Qian, 1998; Silventoinen et al., 2003,
Sutton, 1980; Weiss and Willis, 1997). New developments in the matching literature
have started to address the multidimensional nature of attractiveness by considering
settings with two or more attributes. In particular, several recent studies1 consider
frameworks where multiple characteristics can be summarized by a single, one-
dimensional attractiveness index, so that, technically, the matching process is de
facto one-dimensional. Such a single-index approach is a powerful tool, and it allows
to apply the standard one-dimensional matching techniques to settings with multiple
attributes. However, its validity relies on a strong homogeneity assumption: it must be
the case that the trade-offs between individual female traits are identically perceived
by all men (and similarly for male characteristics). This approach, appealing as it
may seem, is not always appropriate.
When preferences for any of the relevant matching characteristics are
heterogeneous within either the male or the female populations (or both), matching
becomes multidimensional, as long as the traits at stake are not perfectly correlated.
That is, the corresponding traits cannot be collapsed into a single index, and one-
dimensional matching techniques are not well-suited to characterize the corresponding
stable matches. In the marriage market, several characteristics can be heterogeneously
assessed by potential mates, including race, ethnicity, age, health attributes, or
smoking status. For instance, we know that smokers are more likely to marry smokers
(Clark and Etile´, 2006; Maralani, 2009; Sutton, 1980; Venters et al., 1984), and that
a large medical and public health literature essentially shows that non-smokers mind
their partner’s smoking status, while smokers do not.2
The goal of this paper is to extend the standard matching model under
Transferable Utility to a particular case of multidimensional matching, where one
of the characteristics is assessed heterogeneously by potential mates. In particular,
we present a general resolution strategy and characterize the stable matching
when individuals differ in two characteristics.3 We also suggest a new way of
testing matching models. In most one-dimensional matching models, theoretical
implications regarding who marries whom are straightforward; essentially, they
boil down to supermodularity implying assortative matching. In multidimensional
1. See for instance Coles and Francesconi (2013) for a search Non-Transferable Utility (NTU)
approach, Chiappori, Oreffice and Quintana-Domeque (2012) for a general investigation.
2. There is ample medical evidence that second-hand smoking has detrimental health effects on
non-smokers but not on smokers (ASH, 2011; CDC, 2006; Glymour et al., 2008; Mannino et al.,
1997). In addition, the attitude of smokers towards smokers is much more permissive than that of
non-smokers (ASH, 2011; Lader, 2009; Pilkington et al., 2006).
3. Among multidimensional empirical works, Lindenlaub (2014) considers a specific model in
which the distribution of types is normal and the payoff is quadratic to study multidimensional
sorting between workers and jobs in the labor market, while Galichon and Salanie´ (2010) and Dupuy
and Galichon (2014) use a Choo and Siow (2006) framework. For the analysis of dating patterns
using a Gale-Shapley NTU approach, see Banerjee et al. (2013) and Hitsch, Hortac¸su and Ariely
(2010).
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contexts, however, things are much more complex, since theory may imply specific
properties on matching patterns along the various dimensions under consideration.
We argue that such predictions may be taken to the data and tested in reduced
form. Specifically, in this paper we study a parsimonious model and derive a series
of predictions. We then test hypotheses based on these predictions, and find they are
indeed supported by the data. While our hypotheses tests can be formally derived
from several specific stochastic structures found in the literature, we argue that they
do not require explicit assumptions on the stochastic structure of unobservables;
therefore, and in the same spirit as previous tests of index-based models (e.g.,
Chiappori, Oreffice and Quintana-Domeque, 2012), such tests can be viewed as a
useful complement to more structural approaches.
In our model, individuals are characterized by two dimensions. One characteristic
is continuous, and can be interpreted as an index of socioeconomic status (from now
on SES), reflecting differences in education, income, social prestige, and others, or
any combination of those. The other characteristic is discrete, and more precisely
dichotomic. We suggest to interpret the second characteristic as the individual’s
smoking status. The marital surplus function is assumed to be differentiable and
supermodular in the continuous indices, as is common in the literature, and to be
multiplicatively impacted by the discrete characteristic: it may be diminished by the
presence of a smoker in the couple. As long as smoking and socioeconomic status
are not perfectly correlated (and they are not), this heterogeneity in preferences is a
key feature of our setting: it rules out a single-index representation, since the trade-
off between the two characteristics is perceived differently among potential spouses,
which is precisely what index models forbid.
We first analyze, as a benchmark, a fully symmetric version of the model, in
which male and female characteristics play the same role in the surplus function
and are identically distributed. We show that the resulting stable matching exhibits
full segregation, in the sense that smokers exclusively marry smokers. This result is
interesting per se, since it does not depend on the magnitude of the negative impact
of smoking. In our “pure” frictionless framework, therefore, even minor differences in
preferences (or surplus) may result in large-scale segregation; moreover, the latter is
efficient, in the sense that it does maximize total welfare.
We then consider the general asymmetric case. We prove existence and generic
uniqueness of the stable matching and present a general resolution strategy, which
can be used in any discrete or continuous multidimensional framework. Even in our
simple framework, a closed-form characterization of the stable matching cannot be
obtained in the general case; however, we derive general predictions on the form that
the stable matching may take. The analysis of a specific, quadratic case in which a
closed form solution exists is provided in our Supplementary Material.
Next, we further specify the model by assuming that, for any SES level, there
are more male smokers than female smokers among individuals above that SES level,
a pattern that we actually observe in the data. This generates a set of additional
predictions regarding the nature of the stable matching. First, there are no ‘mixed’
couples in which she smokes and he does not, whereas the opposite pattern –he smokes
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and she does not– happens with positive probability. Second, smoking husbands
married to smokers are of higher “quality” (i.e., higher SES) than those married
to non-smokers: smoking “premium” for smoking wives. Third, and conversely, non-
smoking wives married to smoking husbands have a lower SES than those married
to non-smokers: smoking “penalty” for smoking husbands. Fourth, there is positive
assortative matching on SES among couples with identical smoking habits. Fifth,
positive assortative matching on SES by smoking status is stronger at the top of the
SES distribution: smoking husbands (wives) at the top of the SES distribution are
more likely to marry smoking wives (husbands) than those with lower SES. Similarly,
non-smoking husbands (wives) at the top of the SES distribution are more likely to
marry non-smoking wives (husbands) than those with lower SES. Finally, some female
non-smokers may marry either a smoker or a non-smoker with positive probability;
then it must be the case that the smoking husband has a higher SES. Similarly, some
male smokers may marry either a smoker or a non-smoker; but then both women
have the same SES.
We use the Current Population Survey March Supplements data combined with
the Tobacco Use Supplements (TUS) for the period 1996 to 2003. These TUS
supplements, which are widely used in medical research on smoking, provide the
largest representative sample of the US population, and, crucially, allow us to retrieve
information on both spouses.
We follow a reduced-form approach to test the hypotheses based on the
theoretical predictions on the stable matching derived from our deterministic model,
acknowledging that our general model could not be solved under a general stochastic
structure. Our approach is compatible with a Choo-Siow specification, that is, a
framework where unobserved heterogeneity can be fully captured by an additive
random term, which is moreover the sum of two random variables with type 1
extreme value distributions; but it could also be used in alternative settings.4 In
our deterministic model, stability conditions imply that there should be no “mixed”
couples in which she smokes and he does not, whereas the opposite pattern –he
smokes and she does not– should happen with positive probability (the asymmetry
between genders being due to the larger prevalence of male smoking). In a more
complex setting, the presence of either search frictions (a` la Shimer and Smith,
2000) or unobserved matching characteristics (or both) typically results in positive
probabilities for all possible couples. Still, a natural hypothesis is that mixed couples
where the wife smokes should be much less frequent than vice-versa; i.e., the ratio of
the two subpopulation sizes should be significantly lower than what would be implied
by the sole difference in relative smoking prevalence.5 To test this hypothesis, we
compare the actual subpopulations ratio to what it should be under independence
4. Taking the model to the data in a structural way is far beyond the scope of this paper. Extending
the Choo and Siow (2006) methodology to a multidimensional setting with discrete and continuous
characteristics is still an open question, despite recent and promising advances (Chiappori, Salanie´
and Weiss, 2014; Dupuy and Galichon, 2014; Galichon and Salanie´, 2010).
5. In a pure Choo-Siow setting, this hypothesis would follow from a result by Graham (2011).
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for each of the 9 US Geographical Census divisions; interestingly, we find that
the hypothesis is satisfied in each of them, despite significantly different smoking
prevalences across regions. This is consistent with our first prediction.
Similarly, our regression analysis shows that among smoking husbands, those who
marry smoking wives exhibit (on average) 0.15 more years of completed education
(or about a 1.2 percent higher annual earnings) than those with non-smoking
wives, consistent with our second prediction. Conversely, our evidence reveals that
among non-smoking wives, those with smoking husbands exhibit (on average) 0.11 to
0.13 fewer years of completed education than those with non-smoking husbands,
supporting our third prediction. Consistent with our fourth prediction, we also
find positive assortative matching on education for each type of couple, and in
particular for couples with identical smoking habits. In addition, at the top of the SES
distribution, positive assortative matching on education by smoking status is stronger,
supporting our fifth prediction. Finally, the well-known negative correlation between
education and smoking is confirmed in our data, and we estimate that for men this
correlation becomes less negative if one further controls for the wife’s education, while
this pattern does not appear for women; we argue that this fact is in line with our
last prediction.
Perhaps the most informative prediction of our bidimensional matching model is
the one stating that smoking husbands married to smokers have higher SES than
those married to non-smokers. Such a prediction is typical of a matching logic, in
which female smokers eventually benefit from being on the short side of the market.
A potential concern here is that such empirical patterns (even when controlling for
additional covariates), instead of being a consequence of matching mechanisms on the
marriage market, may reflect the fact that smoking behavior is endogenous to marital
status. However, we doubt this can explain our findings. Using information on engaged
couples, newlyweds, and couples married for over 5 years, Sutton (1993) finds that
similarities in smoking status were already present about the time of marriage. More
recently, Banks, Kelly and Smith (2013), who use retrospective evidence from the
Health and Retirement Study, show that most smoking behavior is initiated before
marriage, so that smoking is predetermined with respect to marital status. In addition,
we use a simple and popular estimator in program evaluation (see Wooldridge, 2002)
obtained from an OLS regression of education on spousal smoking status controlling
for the predicted probability that the spouse is a smoker (and its square). The key
variable(s) used in predicting such a probability is (are) the age at which the spouse
started smoking regularly (and its square). Reassuringly, the estimates adjusted by
the spousal propensity to smoke give a similar picture to our main estimates.
Finally, we present two refutability tests in our Supplementary Material: one
based on randomly sorting married men and women to couples, which shows that
the predictions of our model are rejected; another based on testing a single-index
model in education and smoking, which is rejected by the data.
The next Section contains the model. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 tests
the hypotheses based on the theoretical predictions of our model. Section 5 presents
a brief discussion, while Section 6 concludes.
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2. The Model
We present a parsimonious preference model given the two types of characteristics
at stake, defining the surplus structure and the corresponding stable matches under
Transferable Utility (from now on TU).6 After characterizing the equilibrium under
a benchmark “symmetric” case (where male and female characteristics play the same
role in the surplus function and are identically distributed), we analyze the general
case deriving predictions on the form that the stable matching may take, which can
be used in any discrete or continuous multidimensional framework, although a closed-
form characterization of the stable matching cannot be obtained. Finally, we introduce
the male prevalence condition into the model (for any SES level, there are more male
smokers than female smokers among individuals above that SES level), and derive
several predictions that will be the basis of the hypotheses in our empirical analysis.
2.1. The basic framework
2.1.1. Populations. We consider two populations (men and women) of equal size,
normalized to one. Agents differ in two respects. First, they are characterized by
a continuous index; one may, without loss of generality, assume that this index is
uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1]. A possible interpretation is in terms of
socioeconomic status (SES); then the index depends on the agent’s income, education,
prestige, or any combination of those. Second, agents are also characterized by some
dichotomous indicator taking values in the set {N,S}; in our empirical application,
S stands for “smoker” and N for “non-smoker”, although alternative interpretations
are possible. An agent is thus formally characterized by a pair (x,X) if female and
(y, Y ) if male, where x or y ∈ [0, 1] is the agent’s continuous index (i.e., SES), and
X,Y ∈ {N,S} defines the agent’s discrete characteristic (i.e., smoking status). Let F
(resp. G) denote the cumulative distribution of female (male) characteristics (x,X)
((y, Y )) over the set [0, 1] × {N,S}, and let FX (x) (GY (y)) denote the number of
females (males) with smoking status X (Y , with X,Y ∈ {N,S}) and SES no larger
than x (y). In particular, FX (1) and GY (1) respectively denote the total number of
females and males with smoking habits X and Y .
6. The theoretical analysis of matching under TU is typical in marriage market analysis, whereas
models analyzing dating typically consider NTU. Matching under TU dates back to Koopmans
and Beckmann (1957), Shapley and Shubik (1971), and Becker (1973). In particular, the last two
contributions show that the stable matching maximizes aggregate surplus, and that the associated
individual surpluses solve the dual imputation problem. In turn, the surplus maximization problem
belongs to the class of optimal transportation problems, which date back to Monge (1781) and
Kantorovich (1942); see Villani (2003) and McCann and Guillen (2010) for recent presentations.
The precise connection between matching models and optimal transportation has been analyzed by
Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame (1999) in the discrete case, and by Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame (1992),
Ekeland (2010) and Chiappori, McCann, and Nesheim (2010) in the continuous one.
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2.1.2. Surplus. In any married couple, the sum of individual utilities is given by
some function of the partner’s characteristics; as it is customary, we define the surplus
generated by marriage as the difference between this function and the sum of utility
levels that each spouse would reach as single. In our framework, the surplus depends
on both the discrete and the continuous characteristics of each partner. We assume
that the surplus Σ generated by a match between (x,X) and (y, Y ) has the form:
Σ ((x,X) , (y, Y )) = S (x, y) if X = Y = N
Σ ((x,X) , (y, Y )) = λS (x, y) otherwise
The function S is strictly increasing, continuously differentiable and
supermodular; moreover, λ < 1. This means that the impact on marital surplus of the
spouses’ smoking habits is fully summarized by a single parameter λ, which represents
the decrease in surplus due to the presence of (at least) a smoker in the couple. Hence,
in our framework, the surplus of a mixed (smoker, non-smoker) couple is the same as
that of a couple of smokers, but strictly less than of a non-smoking pair.
Restrictive as it may seem, we believe that the common λ assumption is a
reasonable approximation. The multiplicative nature of the impact of λ reflects the
fact that smoking, by reducing life expectancy, decreases the present discounted value
of future welfare proportionally. We believe that this is more realistic than an additive
parameter, as the latter would imply that those couples with lower socioeconomic
resources (and surplus) would be disproportionately penalized by having (at least)
a smoker in the couple. In addition, a large medical and public health literature7
shows that a smoking partner decreases life expectancy of a non-smoker but not of a
smoker, which is compatible with our assumption.8 Last but not least, while the single
parameter λ assumption cannot be directly tested (since the marital surplus is not
observed), one can evaluate its plausibility using auxiliary conditions of the Choo-
Siow type, such as unobserved heterogeneity of type 1 extreme value distribution
form. We perform this exercise and find empirical support for it (see Table S1 in the
Supplementary Material).
2.2. Stable matching
2.2.1. Definition. A matching is defined as a measure µ on the set ([0, 1]× {N,S})2
and four functions uN (x), uS (x), vN (y) and vS (y). Intuitively, for two sets A,B ⊂
7. See for instance ASH (2011), CDC (2006), Glymour et al. (2008), Mannino et al. (1997),
amongst others. Moreover, the attitude of smokers towards smokers is much more permissive than
that of non-smokers (ASH, 2011; Lader, 2009; Pilkington et al., 2006), suggesting that beyond the
impact on life expectancy, the psychological costs of a smoking partner are large for non-smokers
but negligible for smokers.
8. A natural extension would allow the surplus to be decreased by a smaller amount when both
spouses smoke than when only one is a non-smoker; i.e., the surplus would be discounted by λ < 1
if both are smokers, and by λ′ < λ if only one is a smoker. We briefly discuss the implications in
the concluding section (see footnote 15).
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[0, 1] × {N,S}, µ [A,B] denotes the probability that a woman belonging to A is
married with a man belonging to B; and for any female (x,X) (male (y, Y ), with
X,Y ∈ {N,S}), uX (x) (vY (y)) is the utility she (he) receives at a stable matching. A
constraint on µ is that its marginal should equal the initial distributions of individuals;
i.e., the marginal on the set of females (males) is F (G). In addition, on the support
of µ, individual utilities satisfy:
uX (x) + vY (y) = Σ ((x,X) , (y, Y )) ,∀ ((x,X) , (y, Y )) ∈ Supp (µ) ,
reflecting the fact that if two agents may marry with positive probability, their
individual utilities must add up to the surplus they generate when married.
A matching is stable if no matched agent would be better off unmatched, and if
no two individuals would prefer being matched together to their current situation.
Normalizing singles’ utility to zero, stability can be summarized by the following set
of inequalities: for any (x,X) , (y, Y ) we have that
uX (x) ≥ 0, vY (y) ≥ 0 and (1)
uX (x) + vY (y) ≥ Σ ((x,X) , (y, Y ))
therefore
uX (x) + vY (y) ≥ S (x, y) if X = Y = N (2)
≥ λS (x, y) otherwise
where an equality obtains on the support of µ. The first constraints in (1) reflect the
requirement that married people should prefer marriage to singlehood; the second
constraint in (1) expresses that any two individuals cannot, by forming a new match,
strictly increase their current utilities.
2.2.2. Existence. Existence of a stable match stems from general results, which
state that in a TU context, the minimization of aggregate utility over the set of
stable matches is equivalent to the maximization of aggregate surplus over all possible
assignments.9 Formally, if (µ, uN (x) , uS (x) , vN (y) , vS (y)) is a stable matching, then
the measure µ solves
max
ν∈M
∫
Σ ((x,X) , (y, Y ))dν ((x,X) , (y, Y )) (3)
where M denotes the set of measures on the set ([0, 1]× {N,S})2 whose marginal
distributions coincide with the initial measures F and G on the female and male
populations, respectively. Since this set is compact and Σ is continuous in x and y, a
solution exists. Conversely, for any solution µ¯ to the surplus maximization problem,
9. See Chiappori, McCann and Nesheim (2010) for a complete presentation.
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consider the dual program:
min
uN ,uS ,vN ,vS
∫
[0,1]×{N,S}
(1 [X = S]uS (x) + 1 [X = N ]uN (x))dF (x,X)
+
∫
[0,1]×{N,S}
(1 [Y = S] vS (y) + 1 [Y = N ] vN (y))dG (y, Y )
under the constraints in (1). If (u¯N , u¯S , v¯N , v¯S) denotes a solution, then
(µ¯, u¯N , u¯S , v¯N , v¯S) defines a stable matching.
Let us note that there may exist matches involving “mixed strategies”, whereby
an open set of agents are each matched to several agents with positive probabilities. In
our setting, an individual may be indifferent between two types of mates. For instance,
if a woman with SES x0 is a non-smoker, the partial of the surplus with respect to
x is ∂S (x0, y1) /∂x if she marries a non-smoker with SES y1, and λ∂S (x0, y2) /∂x if
she is matched with a smoker with SES y2. While S is strictly supermodular, we may
still have that:
∂S
∂x
(x0, y1) = λ
∂S
∂x
(x0, y2)
with y2 > y1 since λ < 1.
2.3. The symmetric case
As a benchmark, we consider a setting that is totally symmetric between genders.
This implies that (i) male and female characteristics play the same role in the surplus
function (S (x, y) = S (y, x)) and (ii) the distributions of characteristics are identical
for men and women (F = G). Then, the stable matching can easily be characterized.
Proposition 1. Under the symmetry assumptions (i) and (ii) above, there exists a
unique stable matching, which is completely assortative. Smokers only marry smokers,
and non-smokers only marry non-smokers; moreover, in each couple, spouses have the
same SES.
Proof. It is well known that a matching is stable if and only if the corresponding
measure maximizes total surplus. In this context, positive assortativeness within each
smoking category directly follows from supermodularity. We simply need to show
that it cannot be the case that an open set of non-smokers of one gender marry
smokers. Assume it is; then an equal measure open set of non-smokers of the opposite
gender also marry smokers. But since λ < 1, the total surplus is then less than in the
completely assortative matching, a contradiction. 
While the symmetric case is obviously very specific, it constitutes an interesting
benchmark. A first lesson that can be drawn from it is that bidimensional matching of
the type under consideration naturally leads to segregated outcomes. In the symmetric
context, even if the loss incurred when a non-smoker marries a smoker is very small
(i.e., λ is very close to one), the marriage patterns exhibit complete segregation, in
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the sense that smokers exclusively marry smokers and non-smokers exclusively marry
non-smokers. In other words, minor differences in preferences may have a spectacular
impact on marital patterns, particularly in terms of segregation. In addition, one can
easily compute each spouse’s utility at a stable matching (see Appendix).
The preceding conclusions, however, heavily rely on the very specific features
of the symmetric framework. In particular, no trade-off exists between the two
characteristics at the stable matching: there is no point, for a non-smoker, in
considering a smoker as a spouse, since a non-smoker with exactly the same SES
is always available at equilibrium.
2.4. The general case
We now consider the general case. In what follows, let pN (x) be the probability
that a non-smoking woman with SES x marries a smoker (then 1 − pN (x) is the
probability she marries a non-smoker). We define similarly pS (x
′) , qN (y) and qS (y′)
as the probability of marrying a smoker for a female smoker, a male non-smoker and
a male smoker, respectively. These probabilities are endogenous, and are determined
by the equilibrium (stability) conditions.
2.4.1. Qualitative results. In this subsection, we provide some qualitative properties
of the equilibrium, which hold true irrespective of the exact distribution of smokers
and non-smokers in the population and the exact form of the (supermodular) surplus.
A first result expresses the fact that, at a stable matching, matching is positive
assortative on SES among couples with identical smoking habits:
Proposition 2. Consider two matched couples, (x,X) , (y, Y ) and (x′,X) , (y′, Y )
with identical smoking status. For almost all such couples, x≥ x′ if and only if y ≥ y′.
Proof. Assume, for instance, that x ≥ x′ but y < y′ on a subset of positive measure.
The surplus generated by any two such couples is
Σ1 = Σ ((x,X) , (y, Y )) + Σ
((
x′,X
)
,
(
y′, Y
))
while the matching (x,X) , (y′, Y ) and (x′,X) , (y, Y ) would generate a surplus
Σ2 = Σ
(
(x,X) ,
(
y′, Y
))
+ Σ
((
x′,X
)
, (y, Y )
)
> Σ1
by strict supermodularity of Σ in (x, y). Should this situation exist for a non-null set
of couples, the matching would not maximize total surplus, a contradiction. 
The second result states that among individuals with high SES, matching is
assortative on both SES and smoking status. Specifically:
Proposition 3. Assume that the upper bound of the support of the measures FS,
FN ,GS and GN is 1. Then there exist thresholds xN , xS , yN and yS in [0, 1) such
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that for almost all xN ≤ x ≤ 1, xS ≤ x′ ≤ 1, yN ≤ y ≤ 1 and yS ≤ y′ ≤ 1,
pN (x) = qN (y) = 0 and pS
(
x′
)
= qS
(
y′
)
= 1
Proof. See Appendix 
Proposition 3 states that non-smokers with high enough SES marry non-smokers
with probability 1: marrying a smoker would decrease the surplus by a factor λ, which
for high SES can only decrease total surplus. Similarly, smokers with high enough SES
only marry smokers.
However, the previous result is only true at the top of the SES distribution;
further down, randomization may appear at a stable matching. To see why, assume
that the distributions of the male and female populations are such that men are much
more likely to smoke than women. The assortative pattern described in Proposition
2, together with the measure restrictions, imply that both non-smoking wives and
smoking husbands, being on the long side of the market, will have to “marry down”
(i.e., a spouse with relatively lower SES). At some point, the marginal non-smoking
wife may become indifferent between marrying a non-smoker or the marginal smoking
husband, because the resulting loss in total surplus (due to λ < 1) is exactly offset
by the higher SES of the latter.
Note that, in particular, male smokers who match with female non-smokers must
have a higher socioeconomic status than their wife; indeed, the only reason why a
female non-smoker would agree to marry a smoker (thus accepting a shrinkage of total
surplus) is the shortage of male non-smokers. This particular pattern is not directly
linked to the multiplicative nature of the impact of smoking; as soon as marrying a
smoker involves a loss in surplus, we expect similar patterns. What is specific of the
multiplicative setting, however, is that these phenomena do not take place at the top
of the distribution –where the loss is larger.
This same logic also suggests, however, that in a given neighborhood, all forms
of randomization are not simultaneously possible. In our example, for instance, while
female non-smokers may want to marry a smoking spouse, male non-smokers would
not, since they would lose a share λ of the surplus and the opportunity to “marry
up”. This feature is indeed general and is expressed by the following result:
Proposition 4. Assume there exists an open set O such that, for all x ∈ O,
0 < pN (x) < 1 –so that x marries either a non-smoker y or a smoker y
′ with positive
probability. Assume moreover that qS (y
′) > 0 –so that y′also marries a smoker x′
with positive probability. Then qN (y) = 0 and pS (x
′) = 1 almost surely. Moreover,
x′ = x and y′ > y.
Similarly, if for all y in some open set O′, 0< qN (y)< 1 –so that y marries either
a non-smoker x or a smoker x′ with positive probability– and pS (x′) > 0 –so that x′
also marries a smoker y′ with positive probability, then pN (x) = 0 and qS (y′) = 1
almost surely. Moreover, x′ > x and y′ = y.
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Proof. See Appendix 
Proposition 4 states that the various types of randomizations are mutually
exclusive. In the neighborhood of some given SES, it may be the case that female
non-smokers and male smokers intermarry with positive probability; but then, in this
same neighborhood, female smokers and male non-smokers only marry their own type.
Of course, the pattern may be opposite in a different neighborhood;10 ultimately, the
matching patterns depend on the distributions F and G.
2.4.2. Surplus maximization. We now describe the mathematical form of the
problem, and indicate a resolution strategy that works for arbitrary distributions.
Start with the constraint that the marginals of the stable measure µ must coincide
with the female and male population measures. Proposition 2 greatly simplifies the
expression of these constraints. Indeed:
 Consider a non-smoker female with SES x, matched with a non-smoker male with
SES y = ϕN (x). Then the number of non-smoker females with SES higher than
x, married with a non-smoker, must equal the number of non-smoker males with
SES higher than y, married with a non-smoker:∫ 1
x
(1− pN (t))dFN (t) =
∫ 1
ϕN (x)
(1− qN (t))dGN (t) (4)
which defines the function ϕN .
 Similarly, for a non-smoker female with SES x marrying a smoker with SES
y′ = ψN (x): ∫ 1
x
pN (t)dFN (t) =
∫ 1
ψN (x)
(1− qS (t))dGS (t) (5)
which defines ψN .
 For the other combinations of smoking status:∫ 1
x
(1− pS (t))dFS (t) =
∫ 1
ϕS(x)
qN (t)dGN (t) (6)
∫ 1
x
pS (t)dFS (t) =
∫ 1
ψS(x)
qS (t)dGS (t) (7)
In particular, there exists a one-to-one relationship between the four probability
functions (pN , pS , qN , qS) and the four matching functions (ϕN , ϕS , ψN , ψS).
Clearly, the exact marital patterns characterizing the stable matching depend
on the joint distribution of SES and smoking status of the two populations. Here,
we provide the general tool that can be used to solve the problem with arbitrary
10. Examples can readily be constructed by using disconnected subpopulations among both men
and women.
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distributions. The idea, again, is to exploit the duality between stability and surplus
maximization. With the previous notations, aggregate surplus is:
Σ =
∫ 1
0
[(1− pN (t))S (t, ϕN (t)) + λpN (t)S (t, ψN (t))]dFN (t) (8)
+ λ
∫ 1
0
[(1− pS (t))S (t, ϕS (t)) + pS (t)S (t, ψS (t))]dFS (t)
The first integral considers the contribution of the female non-smoker population.
An individual with SES t may (with probability pN (t)) be matched with a smoker
with SES ψN (t), in which case the couple generates a surplus λS (t, ψN (t));
alternatively, she may (with probability 1− pN (t)) be matched with a non-smoker
with SES ϕN (t), generating a surplus S (t, ϕN (t)). Similarly, the second integral
represents the contribution of the female smoker population to total surplus.
A stable matching, defined by the functions pN , pS , qN , qS and ϕN , ϕS , ψN , ψS ,
linked by (4) to (7), maximizes aggregate surplus under the constraints 0 ≤ pA (t) ≤
1, 0 ≤ qA (t) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ ϕA (t) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ ψA (t) ≤ 1, where A = N,S. The stable
matching can therefore be derived as a solution to a maximization (optimal control)
problem. Finally, once the functions pN , pS , qN , qS (or equivalently ϕN , ϕS , ψN , ψS),
which define the stable matching, have been computed, one can readily recover the
intracouple allocation of the surplus (see Appendix).
2.5. The constrained general case
We now introduce the additional assumption that “men smoke more than women,”
in the following sense:
Assumption MP (Male Prevalence) For any SES level x,
FS (x) ≥ GS (x)
In words, for any SES x, there are more male than female smokers with SES
x or larger. This may describe a situation in which men are more likely to smoke,
but also one in which men and women have similar smoking habits but the male SES
distribution first degree dominates the female one, as well as many others. As we shall
see in the empirical part, the MP assumption is satisfied in the data. Under that
assumption, it is possible to characterize the stable matching as follows:
Proposition 5. Assume that the upper bound of the support of the measures FS,
FN ,GS and GN is 1. Then there exist thresholds xN , xS , yN and yS in [0, 1) such
that:
 for almost all xN ≤ x ≤ 1, xS ≤ x′ ≤ 1, yN ≤ y ≤ 1 and yS ≤ y′ ≤ 1,
pN (x) = qN (y) = 0 and pS
(
x′
)
= qS
(
y′
)
= 1
 for almost all x < xN , x
′ < xS , y < yN and y′ < yS,
0 ≤ pN (x) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ qS
(
y′
) ≤ 1, qN (y) = 0 and pS (x′) = 1
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 for any x such that pN (x) > 0, let ϕN (x) and ψN (x) respectively denote the
non-smoker and smoker mate of (x,N). Then
ψN (x) > ϕN (x)
 for any y′ such that qS (y′) < 1, let ϕS (y′) and ψS (y′) respectively denote the
non-smoker and smoker mate of (y′, S). Then
ϕS
(
y′
)
= ψS
(
y′
)
Proof. See Appendix 
Proposition 5 first states that high SES people are exclusively matched to partners
with identical smoking habits –a result already derived by Proposition 3. For lower
SES, randomization may happen, as Proposition 4 indicates, but only in one direction:
non-smoking women may marry smokers, but smoking women and non-smoking men
always marry their own. Lastly, when a female non-smoker may marry both a smoker
and a non-smoker with positive probability, the smoker has a higher SES than the
non-smoker.
A remark coming directly from the optimal control formulation sheds some light
on the form of the randomization. The Hamiltonian corresponding to the program
(8) is linear in pN (x), the coefficient being equal to λS (x,ψN (x)) − S (x,ϕN (x)),
which is always non-positive. For large values of x, ψN (x) and ϕN (x) are both close
to 1, and since λ < 1 the coefficient is negative, implying pN (x) = 0. Randomization
requires the coefficient to be zero; therefore, whenever randomization takes place, it
must be the case that
S (x,ϕN (x)) = λS (x,ψN (x))
(which, incidentally, implies ψN (x) > ϕN (x)). Since both ϕN (x) and ψN (x) depend
on the probability pN (x) (by 4 and 5), pN (x) must be such that this equality holds
over the relevant domain. In addition, the intracouple allocation of the surplus can
be recovered (see Appendix).
Finally, we note that where exactly randomization occurs, and with which
probability, depends on additional assumptions on the exact form of the surplus
function and the two distributions. As an illustration, we provide an example in
the Supplementary Material, where (i) smoking status and SES are independent, (ii)
men are more likely to be smokers than women at all SES levels and (iii) the surplus
S is quadratic and symmetric. In that case, the program can be solved in closed
form. There is a threshold below which non-smoking women randomize their mates;
moreover, the probability does not depend on the SES. More complex patterns can
be constructed by varying the distributions of characteristics.
2.5.1. Theoretical Predictions. In summary, the theoretical predictions of the
constrained general case are:
1. There are no “mixed” couples in which she smokes and he does not, whereas the
opposite pattern –he smokes and she does not– happens with positive probability.
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2. Smoking husbands married to smokers are of higher “quality” (i.e., higher SES)
than those married to non-smokers: smoking “premium” for smoking wives.
3. Non-smoking wives married to smoking husbands have a lower SES than those
married to non-smokers: smoking “penalty” for smoking husbands.
4. There is positive assortative matching on SES among couples with identical
smoking habits.
5. Positive assortative matching on SES by smoking status is stronger at the top of
the SES distribution: smoking husbands (wives) at the top of the SES distribution
are more likely to marry smoking wives (husbands) than those with lower SES.
Similarly, non-smoking husbands (wives) at the top of the SES distribution are
more likely to marry non-smoking wives (husbands) than those with lower SES.
6. When a female non-smoker marries both a smoker and a non-smoker with positive
probability, the smoking husband has a higher SES than the non-smoking one.
When a male smoker marries both a smoker and a non-smoker with positive
probability, both women have the same SES.
3. Data Description
3.1. CPS March and TUS data
Our empirical application uses years of education as the measure of SES and smoking
status for the binary attribute. We use data from the US Current Population Survey
(CPS), specifically its annual March supplements and the Tobacco Use Supplements
(TUS), for the years 1996 to 2003, which provide the largest samples of married
couples for whom information on tobacco use is available. The standard demographic
and education variables are extracted from the annual March CPS supplements, to
which data on smoking status are merged from the TUS. The TUS are monthly CPS
supplements available discontinuously over time and in different months. Specifically,
the available TUS of interest are January and May 1996, 1999, 2000; June 2001;
February 2002; and February and June 2003.
The CPS is a series of monthly cross sections, with a short longitudinal component.
Individuals in the sample are interviewed eight times–four times, followed by a break
of eight months, and then interviewed for the same four months the following year.
As such, it is possible to match observations of the same individuals across months,
using the household and person identification codes, along with the month-in-sample
information. However, several observations are dropped due to the specific design of
the rotation samples by 4-month periods. In addition, we also check for age, gender
and race, to ascertain that the merged observations consistently belong to the same
individual.11
11. Madrian and Lefgren (1999) illustrate and explain the matching procedures to longitudinally
merge the CPS respondents.
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The TUS-CPS is a National Cancer Institute sponsored survey of tobacco use and
policy information that has been administered as part of the CPS since 1992. It is
considered a key and reliable source of national, state, and sub-state level data on
smoking and other tobacco use in US households, which are widely used in medical
research on cancer and other consequences of smoking (e.g., Delnevo and Bauer, 2009;
Mills, Messer, Gilpin, Pierce, 2009). It provides data on a nationally representative
sample of about 240,000 civilian, non-institutionalized individuals aged 15 years and
older.
We are able to match individuals across months, merging the TUS supplements
back to the March supplement of the corresponding year, to build a series of repeated
cross-sections for the years 1996, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003. Due to the CPS
rotation sample design described above, the sample size of each match is at most 14 ,
1
2 ,
or 3/4, of the original March sample size (when matched to June, January and May,
or February, respectively). In general, the farther from March the TUS supplement
month is, the fewer observations can be matched, with the strong restriction that
the TUS months of September (1992, 1995, 1998), and November (2001 and 2003)
cannot be merged back to March, as they do not share any respondent (Madrian and
Lefgren, 1999). Nevertheless, our sample is large, with detailed socioeconomic and
smoking information on both spouses, and (to the best of our knowledge) it is the
first time it is used to study marriage and smoking.
We specifically extract husbands and wives from our merged CPS files. Married
individual records of the reference person and her spouse are then matched on the
household identification code (and household number) to create a single observation
for each couple, keeping only observations of couples who lived in households with
only one family. Our main sample of husbands and wives consists of white couples,
where the wife is between 22 and 32 years old and the husband is between 24 and 34
years old. This demographic group allows us to focus on recently married couples. In
the US the median age at first marriage was around 27 for men and 25 for women for
the period 1996-2007. On the other hand, a lower bound of 22 and 24 years old also
allows us to include college graduates after they have completed their schooling. The
additional two years in the husbands’ bounds are based on the standard median /
mean age difference of two years between male and female spouse (Chiappori, Iyigun
and Weiss, 2009). Note that the March CPS does not record the duration of marriage;
in particular, the June Fertility Supplements that used to provide the age at (first)
marriage, do not contain it any longer in the most recent years that our study is
concerned about.
In addition to individual age, we use the state of residence, year of interview,
sample household weight and education of the individual. From 1992, the CPS records
education as degrees attained rather than years of schooling completed, we thus assign
the number of years of schooling to the corresponding degrees. We will also consider
information on self-reported health status, number of children under age six and
male-head indicator. March CPS household weights are used to make our sample of
couples representative of the US population.
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From the Tobacco Use Supplement, we retrieve information on the smoking status
of each individual. Specifically, we focus on the respondents’ answers to whether and
how often they smoke, whether they have smoked at least 100 cigarettes in their
lifetime, and at which age they started smoking regularly. From the first two questions,
we construct a dummy variable of smoking status, defining a person as a smoker if
she reports to smoke every day or some days, and has smoked at least 100 cigarettes
in her lifetime, and as non-smokers those who say that they never smoke, or those
who have smoked less than 100 cigarettes in their lifetime (CDC definition, NCHS,
2010). Age at which they started smoking regularly, as a predetermined explanatory
variable of current smoking status with respect to marital status, will prove useful
in dealing with the potential endogeneity of smoking with respect to marital status.
Finally, note that each spouse directly reports his/her information, and self-reporting
of smoking status is considered a reliable source of information, as it is found to be
validated by measured serum cotinine levels (Caraballo et al., 2001).
3.2. Smoking Prevalence by Gender
An interesting aspect of the smoking attribute is the asymmetry in the smoking
prevalence across genders. In the US, and actually in many countries, male smokers
largely outnumber female smokers, a discrepancy that has remained stable over the
last decades. This gender asymmetry has been emphasized by the Surgeon General
(e.g., Surgeon General’s Report, 2001), as well as by several studies in various fields
(e.g., Gruber (2001) in economics and O¨berg et al. (2011) in medicine). While a
negative smoking gradient is observed by education (e.g., Gruber, 2001), the gender
gap in smoking prevalence is maintained across all education levels. For instance, in
2007, the prevalence of smokers by educational level among white men and women
25 years of age and over were as follows: 30.8% vs. 23.9% for those with less than
high-school; 29.9% vs. 25.2% for those with high-school; 21.8% vs. 19.6% for those
with some college; and 10.5% vs. 8.2% for those with college or above (NCHS, 2010).
We further investigate this gender smoking asymmetry by computing the number
of smokers by gender and educational attainment (years of education) in our data.
Figure 1 shows that the number of male smokers is always higher than the number
of female smokers, for each educational attainment (years of education). Hence, the
MP assumption is satisfied in our data.
[Figure 1 about here]
3.3. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 displays the summary statistics of the main variables of interest in our sample.
Panel A reveals that women are slightly more educated and slightly less likely to be
in excellent or very good health than their husbands, while their average number of
children under six years old is about 0.8. Panel B reports the same statistics for never
married individuals, showing again that men are healthier and less educated than
women, and with a negligible number of young children. Finally, note the asymmetry
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in the smoking prevalence across genders: the smoking prevalence is 22% for husbands
versus 17% for wives (29% and 26% for never-married men and women).
[Table 1 about here]
4. Empirical Analysis
4.1. From Theory to Data
It is well known by now that matching models are difficult to test from the sole
observation of matching patterns. For instance, the Choo-Siow formulation, where
the matching problem is analyzed as a series of discrete choice models, is exactly
identified and therefore cannot be rejected by the data, even with its strong parametric
assumption, i.e., that unobserved heterogeneity follows a type 1 extreme value
distribution. Here, we suggest that an alternative approach may be feasible. In
more complex settings, including multidimensional contexts, matching theory can
generate strong qualitative predictions. In some cases –including the present one–
hypotheses based on these predictions can be tested in reduced form. Specifically, the
theoretical analysis suggests that matching patterns should exhibit specific features
due to the underlying competitive structure. These features could in principle be
formally derived from an explicit, specific stochastic structure, which can be based
on a Choo-Siow setting (following a line of research initiated by Graham, 2011), but
not in general; an alternative justification would involve a “rank order” property
a` la Fox (2010), or possibly search models. In any case, we argue that if the MP
assumption is satisfied, then we expect the following regularities to hold:
Hypothesis 1: Relative Prevalence of Mixed Couples. Mixed couples in which
the wife smokes (denoted (0,1)) should be less frequent than those in which the
husband smokes (denoted (1,0)). Actually, the MP assumption by itself implies an
asymmetry between the proportions of mixed couples: if there are more male than
female smokers, then one expects more (1,0) couples. To take an easy benchmark,
assume that the proportion of smokers in the male (resp. female) population is
equal to sM (resp. sW ) for all SES levels; then if matching were random with
respect to smoking habits, the ratio of (0,1) to (1,0) couples should be
robserved < rrandom =
sW (1− sM )
sM (1− sW )
In our total sample, sM is .22 and sW is .17, so the ratio r implied by the sole
difference in relative smoking prevalence is around .72; we expect the observed
ratio to be significantly smaller than this threshold. Moreover, the same exercise
can be performed for each “marriage market” (or region).
Hypothesis 2: Smoking “Premium” for Smoking Wives. Among smoking
husbands, those who marry smoking wives should have (on average) a higher
SES than those who marry non-smokers.
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Hypothesis 3: Smoking “Penalty” for Smoking Husbands. Among non-
smoking wives, those who marry smoking husbands should have (on average)
a lower SES than those who marry non-smokers.
Hypothesis 4: Assortativeness by SES among couples with identical
smoking habits. Among couples with identical smoking habits (i.e., both
smokers or both non-smokers), matching should be assortative on SES.
Hypothesis 5: Stronger Assortativeness by Smoking Status at the Top of
the SES Distribution. Smoking husbands (wives) at the top of the SES
distribution are more likely to marry smoking wives (husbands) than those
with lower SES. Similarly, non-smoking husbands (wives) at the top of the SES
distribution are more likely to marry non-smoking wives (husbands) than those
with lower SES.
Hypothesis 6: Conditional versus Unconditional Correlation between
Smoking and SES. When two non-smoking women with the same SES marry
respectively a smoker and a non-smoker, the non-smoker should be on average
of lower SES than the smoker. That is, controlling for the (non-smoking) wife’s
SES, the smoking habit of the husband should be positively correlated with his
SES. This result seems counterintuitive, since a well-established empirical fact is
that the (unconditional) correlation between smoking and education is negative:
low SES is an important predictor of smoking behavior (e.g., CDC, 2010). In the
theoretical framework we use, however, (perfect) assortative matching on SES
implies that, for given smoking habits, the husband’s SES is fully determined
by his wife’s. In reality, agents match on several characteristics (many of them
unobservable), so that the wife’s SES is not a perfect control for the husband’s,
meaning that the (unconditional) negative correlation between smoking and SES
is likely to persist. We therefore restate the prediction as follows: the conditional
correlation between male SES and smoking status, given the SES of non-smoking
wives, should be less negative than the unconditional one. Note that this pattern
should not hold true for women.
The remaining part of the paper is devoted to testing these hypotheses.
4.2. Testing the Hypotheses
4.2.1. Relative Prevalence of Mixed Couples. Table 2 reports both the
observed (Panel A) and random (Panel B) matching patterns by smoking status
for husbands and wives. Panel A reveals that there is strong assortative mating
by smoking status: about 71% of couples have non-smoking spouses, and roughly
10% consists of smokers. This is in line with previous evidence on marital sorting
by smoking status (e.g., Clark and Etile´, 2006). In addition, there are fewer mixed
couples where the wife smokes than vice-versa, 6.7% versus 11.93%. These figures are
very different from the percentages arising from random matching that are reported
in Panel B, where sorting is weaker (the percentage of couples in the main diagonal
is now less than 70%) and the two types of mixed couples are much more prevalent
and similarly represented. Indeed, Panel C shows that the ratio of observed mixed
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couples where the wife smokes than vice-versa is 0.56 (s.e.=0.03), which is statistically
significantly lower than the 0.72 (s.e.=0.02) implied by the sole difference in relative
smoking prevalence, consistently with our hypothesis 1.12 As a last test, in Panel D,
we perform the same exercise at the US Geographical Census division level (which
consists of 9 regions). The results are quite explicit: we find that the prediction is
satisfied in each of these regions. Under the null of random matching, the probability
of such an outcome would be extremely small, i.e., 2−9 ∼= 2 · 10−3.
[Table 2 about here]
4.2.2. Smoking Premium and Smoking Penalty. We investigate hypotheses 2 and 3
in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. They contain a series of regressions in which either
the husband’s or wife’s education is the dependent variable while spouse’s education
and smoking status are the main explanatory variables, for the samples of smoking
husbands or smoking wives in Table 3, and of non-smoking husbands or non-smoking
wives in Table 4. Two specifications are presented: a standard one, with controls for
own age, year and state fixed effects; and another one with additional controls, where
we also include a spousal very healthy indicator, number of children under age six
and a male-head indicator.
[Table 3 about here]
Starting from the left-block of regressions, columns (1) and (2) show that among
smoking wives there is no statistically significant difference in the average years of
completed education between those who marry smoking men and those who marry
non-smoking ones, and that the point estimates are virtually zero. The action is
concentrated in columns (3) and (4): among smoking husbands those who marry
smoking women have on average 0.15 more years of completed education (or about
a 1.2 percent higher annual earnings13) than those with non-smoking ones. This
supports our hypothesis 2.
Our theoretical analysis shows that, given the shortage of smoking women,
smoking men who marry smoking women should be more educated, whereas no such
effect should be observed for women, which is what we observe in the “placebo”
columns (1) and (2). Smoking men have to compete for smoking partners with their
own education. In other words, smoking women “marry up” with respect to her own
education; they “benefit” from the fact that they are on the short side of the market by
marrying a higher “quality” spouse. Note that the sign of the wife’s smoker coefficient
in columns (3) and (4) is opposite to the well-known negative gradient between own
smoking and own education.
12. Standard errors are computed using the delta method. The difference in the ratios is
statistically significant at the 1% (p-value=0.0000).
13. Assuming that each extra year of education an individual gets is worth about an eight percent
increment to their annual earnings.
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The evidence presented in Table 3 is also supportive of our assumptions on the
surplus reduction due to smoking. If, for instance, smokers also preferred non-smokers
then we would not observe the positive coefficient of columns (3) and (4). By the
same token, our empirical evidence also shows that a gender asymmetric perception
of smoking cannot be the driving force behind the observed matching patterns. If
men, regardless of their smoking status, perceived smoking in a woman as a defect,
we would not observe the positive coefficient of columns (3) and (4) either.
We now turn to investigate hypothesis 3. Table 4 inquires about the average
education among non-smoking wives and non-smoking husbands depending on the
smoking status of their spouses. Consistent with hypothesis 3, columns (1) and (2)
show that among non-smoking wives those with smoking husbands have on average
0.13 to 0.11 fewer years of completed education (or about a 0.9 percent lower annual
earnings) than those with non-smoking husbands. In other words, a smoking husband
marries, on average, a worse non-smoking spouse in terms of education than if he
were to be a non-smoker: smoking husbands, who are on the long side of the market,
“marry down”, that is, they are penalized for their “handicap” with a lower “quality”
spouse. This suggests that spousal smoking is a bad characteristic for non-smokers,
and that there is a marriage market “penalty” associated to it, in terms of lower
socioeconomic standards. Finally, columns (3) and (4) show that among non-smoking
husbands those with non-smoking wives have on average 0.24 to 0.21 more years
of completed education than those with smoking wives. Thus, a non-smoking wife
marries, on average, a better non-smoker spouse in terms of education.
[Table 4 about here]
4.2.3. Smoking Premium and Smoking Penalty controlling for the Propensity Score.
Overall, the estimates reported in Tables 3 and 4 are consistent with our model, and
support hypotheses 2 and 3. A potential concern is that smoking status captures some
characteristics that we do not observe in our data (e.g., personality traits) that would
explain the above empirical findings. Although smoking is correlated with self-control
and impatience, recent empirical evidence shows that some non-cognitive skills and
personality traits exhibit negative sorting in the marriage market, opposite to the
strong positive sorting observed for smoking status. Dupuy and Galichon (2014)
and Lundberg (2012) find that there is negative sorting in autonomy, that male
extraversion is negatively correlated with female conscientiousness and risk attitudes,
and male agreeableness is negatively correlated with female extraversion.14
Another concern is whether such empirical patterns (even when controlling for
additional covariates) are the mere reflection of smoking behavior being endogenous
to marital status, rather than a confirmation of the postulated marriage market
mechanism. We explore such a possibility by using a simple and popular estimator
in program evaluation (see Wooldridge, 2002) obtained from an OLS regression of
14. Lundberg (2012) also finds that extraversion and neuroticism only matter for women, while
conscientiousness only for men, in terms of marriage probabilities.
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education on spousal smoking status controlling for the predicted probability that
the spouse is a smoker (the propensity score). The spousal propensity score is the
probability that the spouse is a smoker given a set of observable characteristics. To
make this approach as appealing as possible (at least one of) the predictors must be
predetermined with respect to marital status, and the age at which the spouse started
smoking regularly seems a natural candidate. Hence, we predict the probability that
the spouse j is a smoker (Smokingj = 1) given a set of spousal characteristics (Xj)
using a probability model (Probit):
Smokingj = Φ(Xjβ) + εj (9)
where Φ is the standard normal cdf and Xj contains the following spousal
characteristics: age (in categories), years of education, year fixed effects, state fixed
effects, and age at which the spouse started smoking regularly. We code this last
variable as 0 for never smokers or never regular smokers. For this reason, and the
fact that people who start regularly using tobacco when they are younger are more
likely to have trouble quitting than people who start later in life (Surgeon General’s
Report, 2012), we expect a non-linear relationship between smoking status today and
age at which the individual started smoking regularly, so that we also consider the
square of this variable as an additional predictor.
Once we have estimated the propensity scores ̂Smokingj for men and women (see
Table A1), we then estimate the following OLS regressions
Educationi = α+ δSmokingj + γ ̂Smokingj + ui (10)
for four groups of individuals, smoking wives, smoking husbands, non-smoking
wives, and non-smoking husbands, but also
Educationi = α+ δSmokingj + γ1 ̂Smokingj + γ2 ̂Smoking
2
j + ui (11)
to account for potential nonlinearities of the conditional expectation function of
education in the propensity score. The estimated propensity score plays the role of a
control function.
[Table 5 about here]
[Table 6 about here]
Reassuringly, the estimates displayed in Tables 5 and 6 give a similar picture to our
main estimates in Tables 3 and 4, and are indeed consistent with existing research.
Using information on engaged couples, newlyweds, and couples married for over 5
years, Sutton (1993) finds that similarities in smoking status were already present
about the time of marriage. More recently, Banks, Kelly and Smith (2013), who
use retrospective evidence from the Health and Retirement Study, show that most
smoking behavior is initiated before marriage, so that smoking is not endogenous to
marital status. Controlling for own age in equations (10) and (11) is immaterial for
our findings (results available upon request).
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4.2.4. Assortativeness by SES among couples with identical smoking habits. In Table
7 we investigate the degree of assortativeness by education among different types of
couples depending on spouses’ smoking status. For each type of couple, we regress
own education on spouse’s education controlling for own age, year and state fixed
effects. Our estimates reveal positive assortative matching by education for each type
of couple. Although assortative mating by education has been extensively documented
in the literature (Lam, 1988; Pencavel, 1998; Qian, 1998; Mare, 2008), here we show
that it holds true within each spouses’ smoking category. This is consistent with
hypothesis 4.
[Table 7 about here]
4.2.5. Stronger Assortativeness by Smoking Status at the Top of the SES distribution.
In Table 8 we investigate how the degree of assortativeness by smoking status
varies across the SES distribution. We run regressions of a spousal smoking status
indicator on individual smoking status, individual SES and the interaction of these
two variables. We measure SES in two different ways: years of schooling and high-
school degree or above (12 years of schooling or more). The results of these regressions
suggest that, if anything, “mixed” couples (i.e., where one spouse is a smoker and the
other is not) are less prevalent at high SES, supporting hypothesis 5.
[Table 8 about here]
4.2.6. Conditional versus Unconditional Correlations between Smoking and SES.
Finally, in Table 9 we run regressions of education on smoking status for two samples,
non-smoking women and smoking men, controlling or not for spousal SES. Our
findings support hypothesis 6. Among men married to non-smoking women, smoking
men tend to have (on average) a lower SES (1.3 fewer years of education) but
this difference decreases (to 0.7 years less of education) when controlling for their
wives’ SES. Among women married to smoking men, smoking women tend to have
(on average) a lower SES (around 0.3 fewer years of education) regardless of their
husbands’ SES.
[Table 9 about here]
4.3. Refutability Tests
We implement two types of refutability tests (see Angrist and Krueger, 2001). We
first provide placebo tests based on the idea that the predictions of our model should
not be borne out in the data when married men and women are randomly assigned
to couples. In our second approach, we test the proportionality constraints implied
by an alternative single-index model.
4.3.1. Placebo Tests. We reshuffle our observed married individuals into new
randomly married couples. The way we do it is in two stages. We first keep married
men in our sample and generate a new id drawn from a uniform distribution for each
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of these men, and then rank them according to that pseudo-random id. We do the
same for married women: we generate a new id drawn from a uniform distribution for
each of these women, and then rank them according to that pseudo-random id. We
then merge men and women according to that pseudo-random id. This constitutes our
random matching sample. After that, we investigate whether the hypotheses based
on the predictions of our model are observed in these randomly generated data. The
answer is clearly negative:
 Table S2 in the Supplementary Material shows that with randomly generated
couples, it is not true that among smoking husbands those who marry smoking
wives have (on average) a higher SES.
 Table S3 in the Supplementary Material shows that with randomly generated
couples, it is not true that among non-smoking wives, those who marry smoking
husbands have (on average) a lower SES.
 Table S4 in the Supplementary Material shows that with randomly generated
couples, it is not true that “mixed” couples are less prevalent at high levels of
SES.
 Finally, Table S5 in the Supplementary Material reveals that with randomly
generated couples, hypothesis 6 is not borne out in the data.
All in all, it seems that our model cannot explain the marriage patterns of
randomly generated couples.
4.3.2. Alternative Single-Index Model. Our bidimensional model of smoking and
SES rules out a single index representation: the trade-off between these two
characteristics is perceived differently among potential spouses, which is precisely
what index models forbid. Chiappori et al. (2012) have shown that index models are
testable; they must satisfy a set of proportionality restrictions. In Table S6 in the
Supplementary Material, we show that these predictions are rejected by the data
when the two dimensions are smoking status and SES, providing additional support
for the contention that, albeit very appealing, the single-index model representation
is not always appropriate, and that, in particular, it does not apply to our case.
5. Discussion
Our model parsimoniously assumes that the presence of a smoking spouse decreases
surplus by the same factor irrespective of the partner’s smoking status. This
assumption could be relaxed; one could assume, for instance, that the surplus discount
is larger for mixed couples. The corresponding, more general model would still be
solvable using the same technique. Most general conclusions would remain valid. In
particular, there would be assortative matching at the top of the distribution; if male
smokers outnumbered female ones, then mixed couples would consist of a male smoker
and a non-smoking wife; and in the latter case the wife would “marry up”. However,
other predictions would be lost. For instance, the last statement of Proposition 5
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would no longer hold; when a smoking man randomizes between two potential spouses,
they will not have the same socioeconomic index (although, interestingly, they do in
the data, see Table 6). In addition, the closed-form solution of the uniform-quadratic
example provided in Supplementary Material would no longer be valid; its resolution,
although still feasible, would become more complex (and tedious). For instance, it
would require considering more cases. All in all, the new, and less tractable, model,
would lose in empirical content (although the predictions that would be discarded
are supported by the data), with no significant gain in terms of its basic insights. We
therefore believe that parsimony considerations suggest concentrating on the single λ
case.
6. Conclusions
We develop a bidimensional frictionless matching model on the marriage market
under transferable utility, where individuals are characterized by a continuous trait
(e.g., socioeconomic status) and a binary attribute (e.g., smoking status) which is
heterogeneously (dis)liked in the population. As long as traits are not perfectly
correlated, this heterogeneity is key: it rules out a single-index representation. The
trade-off between the two characteristics is perceived differently among potential
spouses, which is precisely what index models forbid. That is, the corresponding
one-dimensional matching techniques are not well-suited to characterize the stable
matches in this setting, and this paper precisely characterizes a specific extension to
allow for heterogeneous preferences.
The main message of our paper is twofold. First, specific multidimensional models
of matching, although intrinsically more complex than one-dimensional ones, are by
no means intractable. We actually describe a general strategy for tackling problems
of this type, and in particular how the characterization of the equilibrium can be
formulated as an optimal control problem; we also show how such a theoretical
approach can generate strong predictions on matching patterns. While we concentrate
on smoking in our empirical application, other aspects could readily be considered.
Race or ethnicity are important examples (e.g., Chiappori, Oreffice and Quintana-
Domeque, 2016), or characteristics such as age or health attributes.
Secondly, while one-dimensional models are difficult to test, at least in the absence
of additional information on either match-specific surpluses or transfers between
agents, in more complex settings, and particularly in multidimensional contexts, the
strong qualitative predictions that matching theory generates can be taken to the
data. Hypotheses based on these predictions can be tested in reduced form. In our
case, the model predicts a series of specific patterns (from the relative scarcity of
couples where the wife smokes and the husband does not, to the opposite association
of a smoking spouse on one’s education for wives and husbands) that are difficult to
justify otherwise, and can be directly tested in a simple and robust way. We do not
view such a strategy as a substitute for more explicitly structural approaches, but we
believe it provides an informative complement.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Means (Standard Deviations)
A. Married Husbands Wives
Age (years) 29.48 27.81
(2.80) (2.78)
Education (years) 13.65 13.79
(2.37) (2.30)
Smoke (= 1 if every day / some day smoker and 100 cigarettes in their lifetime) 0.22 0.17
(0.42) (0.38)
Very Healthy (= 1 if excellent or very good self-reported health) 0.83 0.80
(0.38) (0.40)
Number of children under age 6 0.83
(0.85)
Number of couples 10,305
B. Never Married Men Women
Age (years) 28.24 25.91
(3.12) (3.06)
Education (years) 13.77 13.99
(2.28) (2.22)
Smoke (= 1 if every day / some day smoker and 100 cigarettes in their lifetime) 0.29 0.26
(0.45) (0.44)
Very Healthy (= 1 if excellent or very good self-reported health) 0.79 0.77
(0.41) (0.42)
Number of children under age 6 0.04 0.15
(0.24) (0.44)
Number of individuals 8,990 9,361
Note. CPS 1996-2003, Men aged 24-34, Women aged 22-32. Sampling weights are used.
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Table 2: Matching Patterns by Smoking Status
A. Observed Non-Smoking Wife Smoking Wife
Non-Smoking Husband 70.93% 6.70%
(7,390) (683)
Smoking Husband 11.93% 10.44%
(1,211) (1,021)
B. Random Non-Smoking Wife Smoking Wife
Non-Smoking Husband 64.32% 13.30%
Smoking Husband 18.53% 3.83%
C. Prevalence Ratios of Mixed Couples Observed Random
Ratios 6.7011.93 = 0.56
13.30
18.53 = 0.72
[0.03] [0.02]
D. Prevalence Ratios of Mixed Couples by Census Division Observed Random
Ratios in Census Division 1 (New England) 0.57 0.72
[0.12] [0.08]
Ratios in Census Division 2 (Middle Atlantic) 0.63 0.73
[0.09] [0.07]
Ratios in Census Division 3 (East North Central) 0.67 0.80
[0.09] [0.06]
Ratios in Census Division 4 (West North Central) 0.62 0.75
[0.11] [0.08]
Ratios in Census Division 5 (South Atlantic) 0.43 0.63
[0.07] [0.05]
Ratios in Census Division 6 (East South Central) 0.58 0.75
[0.12] [0.08]
Ratios in Census Division 7 (West South Central) 0.48 0.67
[0.08] [0.06]
Ratios in Census Division 8 (Mountain) 0.55 0.70
[0.09] [0.07]
Ratios in Census Division 9 (Pacific) 0.56 0.69
[0.10] [0.08]
Note. Sampling weights are used. Weighted % and (non-weighted number of observations).
“Delta method” standard errors in brackets.
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Table 3:
Regressions of Education on Spousal Smoking Status for Smokers
Sample
Smoking Wives Smoking Husbands
Dependent variable: Wife’s Education Husband’s Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spouse is a Smoker −0.002 −0.006 0.139* 0.151*
(0.092) (0.092) (0.080) (0.080)
Spouse’s Education 0.471*** 0.461*** 0.555*** 0.542***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028)
Standard controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
N 1,704 1,704 2,232 2,232
R2 0.28 0.29 0.37 0.37
Note. Standard controls: own age, year and state fixed effects.
Additional controls: spousal very healthy indicator, number of children
under age 6 and a male-head indicator.
Sampling weights are used.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1
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Table 4:
Regressions of Education on Spousal Smoking Status for Non-Smokers
Sample
Non-Smoking Wives Non-Smoking Husbands
Dependent variable: Wife’s Education Husband’s Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spouse is a Smoker −0.133** −0.108* −0.235*** −0.208***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.080) (0.080)
Spouse’s Education 0.636*** 0.608*** 0.684*** 0.669***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
Standard controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
N 8,601 8,601 8,073 8,073
R2 0.48 0.49 0.46 0.47
Note. Standard controls: own age, year and state fixed effects.
Additional controls: spousal very healthy indicator, number of children
under age 6 and a male-head indicator.
Sampling weights are used.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1
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Table 5:
Regressions of Education on Spousal Smoking Status for Smokers
Controlling for Spousal Propensity to Smoke P̂ (Spouse′s characteristics)
Sample
Smoking Wives Smoking Husbands
Dependent variable: Wife’s Education Husband’s Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spouse is a Smoker −0.002 0.004 0.247* 0.243*
(0.150) (0.164) (0.130) (0.138)
P̂ (Spouse′s characteristics) −0.581** 2.77*** −0.734*** 3.17***
(0.243) (0.797) (0.207) (0.707)
P̂ (Spouse′s characteristics)2 — −4.86*** — −5.87***
(0.962) (0.897)
N 1,656 1,656 2,204 2,204
R2 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03
Note. P̂ (Spouse′s characteristics) is the predicted probability of a spouse smoking
status using a Probit.
Spouse′s characteristics: age (in categories), years of education,
age when he/she started smoking, and its square (in columns (2) and (4)), year and
state fixed effects.
Sampling weights are used. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1
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Table 6:
Regressions of Education on Spousal Smoking Status for Non-Smokers
Controlling for Spousal Propensity to Smoke P̂ (Spouse′s characteristics)
Sample
Non-Smoking Wives Non-Smoking Husbands
Dependent variable: Wife’s Education Husband’s Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spouse is a Smoker −0.228** −0.237** −0.462*** −0.446***
(0.101) (0.096) (0.112) (0.111)
P̂ (Spouse′s characteristics) −1.42*** 2.46*** −1.00*** 0.709
(0.132) (0.565) (0.145) (0.539)
P̂ (Spouse′s characteristics)2 — −5.67*** — −2.70***
(0.851) (0.835)
N 8,529 8,529 8,038 8,038
R2 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02
Note. P̂ (Spouse′s characteristics) is the predicted probability of a spouse smoking
status using a Probit.
Spouse′s characteristics: age (in categories), years of education,
age when he/she started smoking, and its square (in columns (2) and (4)), year and
state fixed effects.
Sampling weights are used. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1
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Table 7: Assortative Matching by Education
Regressions of Education on Spousal Education by Type of Couple
Both Non-Smokers Both Smokers
Wife’s Husband’s Wife’s Husband’s
Education Education Education Education
Spouse’s Education 0.641*** 0.695*** 0.464*** 0.440***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.037) (0.035)
N 7,390 7,390 1,021 1,021
R2 0.47 0.47 0.27 0.28
Smoking Husband Non-Smoking Husband
Non-Smoking Wife Smoking Wife
Wife’s Husband’s Wife’s Husband’s
Education Education Education Education
Spouse’s Education 0.604*** 0.619*** 0.482*** 0.488***
(0.034) (0.040) (0.047) (0.044)
N 1,211 1,211 683 683
R2 0.44 0.44 0.33 0.31
Note. All regressions include own age, year and state fixed effects.
Sampling weights are used. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1
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Table 8: Assortativeness in Smoking Status by SES
Regressions of Spousal Smoking Status
Wife is a Smoker Husband is a Smoker
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Education −0.014*** — −0.022*** —
(0.001) (0.002)
Smoker 0.239*** 0.311*** 0.389*** 0.375***
(0.074) (0.032) (0.103) (0.045)
Education × Smoker 0.009 — 0.004 —
(0.006) (0.008)
High School (or more) — −0.034** — −0.105***
(0.016) (0.020)
High School (or more) × Smoker — 0.073** — 0.092*
(0.035) (0.047)
N 10,305 10,305 10,305 10,305
R2 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.19
Note. All regressions include spouse’s age, year and state fixed effects.
Sampling weights are used. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1
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Table 9: Conditional and Unconditional Correlations
Regressions of Education on Smoking Status
Sample
Non-Smoking Women Smoking Men
Dependent variable: Husband’s Education Wife’s Education
Unconditional Conditional Unconditional Conditional
Smoker −1.34*** −0.657*** −0.339*** −0.314***
(0.076) (0.063) (0.094) (0.080)
Spouse’s Education — 0.683*** — 0.559***
(0.014) (0.025)
Adjusted Wald Test
Test of Equality (p-value) 0.0000 0.6291
N 8,601 8,601 2,232 2,232
Note. All regressions include own age, year and state fixed effects.
Sampling weights are used. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1
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Table A1: Propensity to Smoke
Probit Models of Smoking Status on Explanatory Variables
Wives Husbands
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age individual started smoking regularly 0.146*** 0.275*** 0.156*** 0.290***
(0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.013)
Age individual started smoking regularly2 — −0.006*** — −0.007***
(0.0005) (0.0006)
Education −0.126*** −0.108*** −0.138*** −0.127***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012)
Age fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
State fixed effects YES YES YES YES
N 10,185 10,185 10,242 10,242
Pseudo-R2 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.55
Note. Sampling weights are used. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1
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Figure 1. Number of Smokers by Educational Level and Gender. Married.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 3
Take some small ε > 0 such that
S (1− ε, 1− ε) > λS (1, 1)
Define η (ε) > 0 by ∫ 1
1−ε
dFN (s) =
∫ 1
1−η(ε)
dGN (s) . (A.1)
so that there are exactly as many non-smoking men with SES above 1− η (ε) as non-
smoking women with SES above 1− ε. We claim that almost all female non-smokers
with SES at least 1− ε are married with a male non-smoker with SES at least 1− η (ε)
(note that (A.1) then implies that, conversely, almost all male non-smokers with SES
at least 1 − η (ε) are married with a female non-smoker with SES at least 1 − ε).
Assume not, then there exists a positive measure set O of female non-smokers with
SES at least 1 − ε married with a smoker. By (A.1), there must exist a set O′ of
identical measure gathering male non-smokers with SES at least 1− η (ε), who are
not married with female non-smokers with SES at least 1− ε. Then either almost all
males in O′ are married with non-smokers with SES less than 1− ε, or a non-null
subset of males in O′ is matched with smokers.
We start with the second case. Let x ∈ O, y her (smoking) match, and y′ ∈ O′
matched with a smoker x′. Surplus is
Σ = λS (x, y) + λS
(
x′, y′
)
while matching x and y′ would generate a surplus
Σ1 = S
(
x, y′
)
+ λS
(
x′, y
)
By definition of ε, Σ1 > Σ, a contradiction.
Assume now that almost all males in O′ are married with non-smokers with SES
less than 1− ε. Let x ∈ O be matched with yS , smoker, while y′ ∈ O′ is matched with
a non-smoking wife x′ < 1− ε. The surplus generated is thus
Σ = S
(
x′, y′
)
+ λS (x, yS)
whereas mixing matches would generate
Σ1 = S
(
x, y′
)
+ λS
(
x′, yS
)
Note that yS > 1− η (ε), for otherwise
Σ1 −Σ = S
(
x, y′
)− S (x′, y′)− λ (S (x, yS)− S (x′, yS))
> S
(
x, y′
)− S (x′, y′)− (S (x, yS)− S (x′, yS)) > 0
by supermodularity, which contradicts surplus maximization. Define
ϕ (s) = S (x, s)− S (x′, s)
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then ϕ is differentiable and strictly positive on [0, 1]. We have that∣∣ϕ (y′)− ϕ (yS)∣∣ ≤ ∣∣y′ − yS∣∣M
where M = sup[0,1] |ϕ′|, and where |y′ − yS | ≤ η (ε). It follows that
ϕ (yS) ≤ ϕ
(
y′
)
+ η (ε)M
therefore
Σ1 −Σ = ϕ
(
y′
)− λϕ (yS) ≥ (1− λ)ϕ (y′)− λη (ε)M
which is positive for ε small enough, a contradiction.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 4
The proof relies on the following Lemma:
Lemma B.1. If an open set of non-smoking women are indifferent between marrying
a smoker and a non-smoker, and marry any with positive probability at a stable
match, then the smoker has a higher SES than the non-smoker. However, if a smoker
is indifferent between marrying a smoker and a non-smoker, and marries any with
positive probability at a stable match, then the two potential spouses have the same
SES.
Proof. Assume Ms. x marries either Mr. y (a non-smoker) or Mr. y′ (a smoker) at
the stable match; let u (x) denote her utility. Then by stability
u (x) = max
s
(S (x, s)− vN (s))
= max
s′
(
λS
(
x, s′
)− vS (s′))
where vN (s) (resp. vS (s
′)) is the utility of a non-smoker (smoker) with SES s (s′);
note that the max is reached for s = y and s′ = y′ respectively. By the envelope
theorem:
u′ (x) =
∂
∂x
S (x, y) = λ
∂
∂x
S
(
x, y′
)
Since ∂S/∂x is strictly increasing in y, λ < 1 requires y′ > y. The proof of the second
claim is similar. 
We can now prove the proposition. By Lemma 1, y′ > y and x = x′. Assume that
qN (y)> 0, i.e., that y marries a smoker x
′′ with positive probability. Then x′′ > x= x′
by Lemma 1. But the couples (x′′, y) and (x′, y′) generate a surplus
Σ = λS
(
x′′, y
)
+ λS
(
x′, y′
)
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while the mixed couples (x′, y) and (x′′, y′) would generate a surplus
Σ1 = λS
(
x′, y
)
+ λS
(
x′′, y′
)
and Σ1 > Σ by supermodularity of S; an open set of marriages satisfying this pattern
would violate surplus maximization.
Similarly, assume that pS (x
′) < 1, i.e., that x′ marries a non-smoker y¯ with
positive probability. Then y¯ = y′ > y by Lemma 1. The couples (x, y) and (x′, y¯)
generate a surplus
Σ = S (x, y) + λS
(
x′, y¯
)
while the mixed couples (x, y¯) and (x′, y) would generate a surplus
Σ1 = S (x, y¯) + λS
(
x′, y
)
Since
S (x, y¯)− S (x, y) = S (x′, y¯)− S (x′, y) > λ (S (x′, y¯)− S (x′, y))
we have that Σ1 > Σ; again, an open set of marriages satisfying this pattern would
violate surplus maximization. The proof of the last statement is identical.
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 5
The first statement is a direct consequence of Proposition 3. Similarly, the last two
statements directly follow from Lemma 1 above. To establish the second, we need to
show that any mixed marriage can only involve a non-smoking woman and a male
smoker. Under the Male Prevalence assumption, this directly follows from the proof
of Proposition 4.
Appendix D: Recovering individual utilities in the stable match
D.1. The symmetric case
Assume Ms. x (a non-smoker) marries Mr. y (also a non-smoker) at the stable match;
note that x = y by the previous Proposition. Let uN (x) (resp. vN (y)) denote her
(his) utility. Then
uN (x) + vN (x) = S (x, x)
By symmetry:
uN (x) =
S (x, x)
2
, vN (y) =
S (y, y)
2
and similarly
uS (x) = λ
S (x, x)
2
, vS (y) = λ
S (y, y)
2
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D.2. The general case
Consider for instance a non-smoker wife with SES x. If her husband is a non-smoker
with SES ϕN (x), then stability implies that:
uN (x) = max
y
(S (x, y)− vN (y))
the maximum being reached for y = ϕ (x). It follows, from the envelope theorem, that
u′N (x) =
∂S
∂x
where the right-hand side derivative is taken at the point (x,ϕN (x)). Then:
uN (x) =
∫ x
0
∂
∂x
S (t, ϕN (t))dt+K
where K is a constant; and a similar expression obtains for the other utilities. The
various utilities are therefore defined up to an additive constant each; the constants,
in turn, are pinned down by the adding up property on the support of µ and the
indifference conditions.
In particular, it becomes possible to compute the difference uN (x)−uS (x), which
can be interpreted as the cost of smoking on the marriage market − or equivalently
as the gain that would result from quitting − for a woman with SES x.
D.3. The constrained general case
We now compute individual utilities at the stable matching, as a function of SES,
gender and smoking habit. Specifically:
Proposition D.1. Under the MP assumption, individual utilities uN (x) , uS (x) , vN (y) , vS (y)
are all increasing. For all x and all y,
uN (x) ≥ uS (x) and vN (y) ≥ vS (y)
Moreover, whenever pN (x) > 0, then
uN (x) = uS (x)
Lastly, for x and y large enough, the differences uN (x)− uS (x) and vN (y)− vS (y)
are increasing (in x and y respectively).
Proof. Assume Ms. x marries either Mr. y (a non-smoker) or Mr. y′The first
inequality comes from the fact that, for any given SES, a non-smoker can only be
either an equivalent or a better partner than a smoker. Next, if pN (x) > 0, both a
smoking and a non-smoking wives marry the same smoking husband with positive
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probability. Since the total surplus is the same in both cases, their utility must be
the same. Lastly, first order conditions give that
u′N (x) =
∂
∂x
S (x,ϕN (x)) > 0
u′S (x) = λ
∂
∂x
S (x,ψS (x)) > 0
so that
(uN (x)− uS (x))′ = ∂
∂x
S (x,ϕN (x))− λ ∂
∂x
S (x,ψS (x))
For x large enough, both ϕN (x) and ψS (x) are close to 1, and that difference is
positive. 
In short, utility increases with the person’s SES, and smokers are never better
off than non-smokers. However, whenever randomization takes place, a woman’s
welfare does not depend on her smoking status: both smokers and non-smokers marry
a smoking husband with positive probability, with whom they generate the same
surplus. For men, on the other hand, welfare is always smaller for smokers. Finally,
at the top of the SES distribution, the cost of being a smoker increases with social
status. In the uniform-quadratic example we present in the Supplementary Material,
things are even simpler: the cost, for a woman, of being a smoker (as measured by the
difference uN (x)− uS (x)) is zero below the randomization threshold and increases
with SES above it; for men, it is always positive and always increasing.
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